Why britain entered ww1

In the circumstances that Britain faced in August , I think that going to war was an understandable decision. The Germans had invaded Belgium and were threatening France, and historically Britain has never felt comfortable with a hostile power occupying the ports just across the English Channel.

It was a difficult decision for the Liberal cabinet, particularly David Lloyd George, who was a radical but had anti-war roots. His evolution over those few weeks is a very striking indication of the way in which British opinion developed.

The decisions made by the British cabinet in the first days of August had truly devastating consequences. Yet the reality was that, by the time the British cabinet agonised over the decision to go to war, they had little choice.

They expected a short war. They also initially expected that Britain would only provide naval and financial support to France rather than sending in a land army. By 2 August, most of the major decisions that caused the war had already been taken in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and elsewhere. The British government had, in fact, delayed getting involved for as long as possible: the foreign secretary, Edward Grey, had proposed a conference to find a peaceful solution to the crisis only to be rebuffed.

The cabinet had even privately discussed turning a blind eye and not entering the war if Germany only breached a small corner of Belgium, but it rapidly became clear that its army was intent on invading the whole country with a view to ruthlessly occupying it.

Could Britain have stayed out of the war? The reality was that even those states that remained neutral at the outset — such as Italy or the US — ultimately found themselves forced to take sides and enter the conflict. Based on what they knew in those early August days, the British cabinet believed entering the war was the right decision.

Britain declared war on Germany in support of Belgium and France, and on Turkey because of her alliance with Germany. Britain declared war on Germany on August 4th , but rivalry between the two countries had been growing for years.

Soon however most of the major nations of the world would become involved in the war. In much the same way, colonies of the other European nations also entered the war, including many Asian and African countries.

Initially neutral, the United States of America entered the war on April 6th Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia — 28th July 3. Germany declares war on Russia — 1st August 4. Germany invades Belgium — 3rd August 5.

Germany declares war on France — 3rd August 6. Britain declares war on Germany — 4th August 7. This essay does not intend to go to great length to assess German motivations for building its navy, but only to illustrate the controversy surrounding the topic, to explain how British thinking towards Germany changed because of this.

As has already been addressed, the Royal Navy was paramount in British considerations towards other powers, so the idea of German rivalry at sea was not welcomed by the British at all. Howard has provided a good summary of British anxieties. Regardless of German ambition, the expansion to its navy and its sudden imperial agenda was seen as a direct threat to the British Empire. This new threat at the heart of British anxieties is key to understanding the British motivations in the July crisis of When Britain made the decision to go to war, unlike any of the other European powers it was not faced by an imminent danger of invasion.

There were not troops marching towards it borders and it was not presented with an unacceptable ultimatum. The nature of the threat to Britain was more subtle than this, but when considered in relation to the perceptions held by the British it was just as sinister.

The prospect of a war involving France and Russia against the growing power of Germany, that did not involve Britain could end with two consequences depending on which side was victorious.

The first was that Germany, a power that as has been discussed was seen to by the British to be hostile to its interests, would be victorious and would conquer most of Europe. Sheffield has explained the predicament the British faced with this consequence. With France and Russia defeated the balance of power that Britain relied upon to insure her own security was void.

Furthermore, the reference to major ports, namely those of the Low Countries would suggest British interest in the protection of Belgium. However, this is only important in the event of a hostile power dominating the continent.

German invasion of Belgium in did not necessitate a war between the two powers but was adequate in qualifying in the minds of the British the nature of the threat that lay ahead should victory be found by the Germans. The second consequence of a continental war that did not involve Britain was that France and Russia could defeat Germany alone.

This would not mean that Britain was no longer threatened, far from it. It may therefore, be conclusively stated that under no circumstances, was Britain faced with a favourable outcome to war between the continental powers.

When war became imminent, the British government came to the same conclusions. With no power to negotiate any further, Britain was forced to enter the war to make sure that it did end in a favourable manner.

As Sheffield states:. Compliant with this statement, British policy also continued in its long struggle to maintain the greatness of Britain, by securing an advantageous platform from which it could maintain the strength of the Empire. In , Britain faced the catastrophic choice between war and its own demise as a world power. The neutrality of Belgium whilst important to Britain was in no way the reason Britain went to war, but served as a focus for the British public to realise the danger, in a way that they could understand, that threatened them if they failed to act decisively.

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